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MATERIAL PERSONS AND THE DOCTRINE
OF RESURRECTION
Lynne Rudder Baker

Many Christians assume that there are only two possibilities for what a
human person is: either Animalism (the view that we are fundamentally
animals) or Immaterialism (the view that we are fundamentally immaterial
souls). I set out a third possibility: the Constitution View (the view that we
are material beings, constituted by bodies but not identical to the bodies
that now constitute us.) After setting out and briefly defending the
Constitution View, I apply it to the doctrine of resurrection. I conclude by
giving reasons for Christians to prefer the Constitution View of human persons to both Animalism and Immaterialism.

Many Christians almost instinctively believe that they have immaterial
souls-souls that, they hope, will survive their bodily death. One reason
for this belief is the assun1ption that the idea of an immaterial soul is
required to make sense of the Christian doctrine of life after death.
Christians typically think that there is no possibility of life after death
unless human persons have immaterial souls that can exist independently
of any body whatever. Almost every major thinker in Christian history has
held this view. Let us give the name 'Immaterialism' to the thesis that a
human person most fundamentally is (or has) an immaterial soul.
It is natural-though mistaken, I believe-to assume that if human persons do not have immaterial souls, then they must have the persistence conditions of animals. (Something's persistence conditions specify the changes
that the thing could survive and the changes that would destroy the thing.)
To say that human persons have the persistence conditions of animals is to
say that whatever would make an animal go out of existence would make a
human person go out of existence. Indeed, I believe that one major incentive to Immaterialism is the assumption that the only alternative to belief in
immaterial souls is a thesis that has been called 'Animalism.'l Animalism is
the view that humal1 persons most fundamentally are animals. According
to Animalism, if the anima I that you are is gone forever, so are you.
Animalism entails that any change that permanel1tly destroys your body
permanel1tly destroys you. If Animalism is the correct view of human persons, then a human person is identical to an animal, a biological organism:
human persons most fundamel1tally are organisms.
Suppose that Animalism is correct and that a human person has the persistence conditions of an organism. Then, a human person lives after death
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if and only if a particular organism lives after death. The Christian view is
that tl1ere will be a general resurrection at the end of time at some point
indefinitely in the future. Even assuming that the organism was not obliterated at death, the many different things that can happen to human
organisn1s after death-buming, or, at best, decay-do not leave one sanguine about the possibility that thousands of years after the death of an
organism, that very organism could live again. No doubt God could
reassemble all the atoms that once made up a living human animal and
"breathe life" back into then1. But would such a reassembled organisn1 be
the same one that had been destroyed? Peter van Inwagen has argued that
it could not. An organism miraculously assembled from the dust of a
decayed organism (or the ashes of a burned organism) cannot be the same
organism as the one that decayed or burned. 2 Not even God could make it
the case that the later-assembled organism was identical to the decayed or
burned organism. Therefore, although God could make an organism out
of dust or ashes, that later organism would not be the original organism.
So, even if Animalism is correct-and a human person is identical to a
human organism-the later organism would not be the original person.
Thus, the doctrine of bodily resurrection presents a prima facie problem for
Animalists-a prima facie problem, but if Peter van Inwagen and Deal1
Zimmerman are right, not an insurmountable problem. 3 Nevertheless, if
Animalism is the only alternative to Immaterialism, it is no surprise that
Christians tend to be Immaterialists.4
Whether or not Animalism is ultimately incon1patible with Christian
doctrine,s I want to argue that the Animalism/lmmaterialism dic110tomy is
a false one. Both the Immaterialist and the Anin1alist, in effect, accept the
following conditional: 6
If human persons do not have immaterial souls, then they have the
persistence conditions of animals.
On the one hand, the Animalist performs a modus ponens on the conditional and concludes that human persons have the persistence conditions
of anin1als. On the other hand, the Immaterialist performs a modus tollens
on the conditional and concludes that human persons have imn1aterial
souls. By contrast, I want to say "a pox on both your houses" and reject
the conditional altogether.
Before turning to presentation of my own view-the COl1stitution
View-let me mention another alternative-a kind of hybrid of
Immaterialism and Animalism. I take Thomas Aquinas's view to be such a
hybrid. Following Aristotle, Aquü1as took human persons to be rational
anin1als. Unlike Aristotle, Aquinas thought that the soul, the form of the
body, was separated from tl1e body at death. He regarded the soul to be an
incorporeal and subsistent forn1 that could exist without a body between a
person's death and the general resurrection. 7 The soul itself is not the person, but is a kind of placeholder for the person. At the general resurrection, a person's soul is reunited to her animal body, and the person lives
again. So, Aquinas shares with the Immaterialist the view that human persons have immaterial souls that can exist independently of any body and
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shares with the Animalist the view that human persons are animals; but he
is neither an Immaterialist nor an Animalist as I have defined thema A
human person, on Aquinas's view, is an animal informed by a rational (i.e.,
immaterial) soul. However, since Aquinas supposes that a human's rational soul can exist apart from any body whatever, I COLlnt him with the
Immaterialists. 8
The Constihltion View offers an alternative not only to the thesis that
human persons are most fundamentally immaterial souls, but also to the
thesis, endorsed by Thomas AqLlinas, that human persons have immaterial
souls at alle Hellce, I take the Constitution View to offer an alternative to
Thomas Aquinas's hybrid Immaterialism, as weIl as to both the more
straightforward Immaterialism and Animalism, as I have defined thema
My argument will consist in putting forth a view of human persons that
avoids both Animalism and Immaterialism. Neither are we most fundamentally animals, nor do we have immaterial souls that can exist apart
from any body. As I have urged elsewhere/ the Christian doctrine of resurrection does not require Immaterialism-or any kind of dualism that
takes hLlman persons to have immaterial souls. Here I want to set OLlt a
materialistic alternative to both Immaterialism and An.in1alisn1. I call this
alternative 'the Constitution View.' The Constitution View gives persistence conditions of human persons that differ from the persistence conditions of organisms, without requiring that human persons have immaterial
souls. After setting out the Constitution View and pointing out how it
avoids both Immaterialism and Animalism, 1'11 defend it from criticisms,
and then apply it to the doctrine of resurrection. 1'11 conclude by giving
reasons for Christians to prefer the Constitution View of hLlman persons to
both Animalism and Immaterialism.
The Constitution View

0/ Human Persons

According to Animalism, human persons are most fLlndamentally organisms, and thus have the persistence conditions of organisms. According to
the Constitution View, our persistence conditions are not those of organisms. Nevertheless, we are embodied, and our bodies are indeed organisms. The reason that we do not have the persistence conditions of organisms is that, according to the Constitution View, we are not identical to our
bodies; we are not most fundamentally organisms. Rather we are most
fundamentally persons, and a person is a being with a first-person perspective. A human person is a person (i.e., a being with a first-person perspective) who is constituted by a human body. A first-person perspective, or
even a physical capacity for supporting one, is irrelevant for the existence
of an organism; it is essential for the existence of aperson.
The relation between a human person and her body is not one of identity, but of constitution. Constitution is a relation intermediate between
identity and separate existence. 10 I have gone to some lel1gths elsewhere to
give a technical account of the notion that absolves it of charges of incoherence and obscurity.ll Here I just want to give an informal description. On
the one hand, we need constitution to be similar to idel1tity in order to
account for the fact that if x constitutes y at t, then x and y are spatially
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coincident at t and have many of the same properties at t. For example, if a
particular 6-foot piece of pink marble constitutes a statue, then the statue
and the piece of marble are located in exactly the same place; and the statue/ as weH as the piece of marble, is 6-foot and pink. If the statue is worth a
million dollars, then so is the piece of marble. On the other hand, we need
constitution not to be the same relation as identity in order to account for
the fact that x might not have constituted y even if x does in fact does constitute y. The piece of marble might have remained in the quarry and
never have constituted a statue, even if in fact it does constitute astatue.
Identity, classically understood, is a necessary relation; constitution is a
contingent relation. In short, constitution is not identity, but iSt nevertheless, a relation of sameness or unity.
According to the Constitution View, the relation between a human person and her body (the relation that I am calling 'constitution/) is exactly the
same as the relation between astatue and the piece of marble that makes it
up/ or between Betsy Ross/s first D.S. flag and the piece of cloth that makes
it up/ or between a river and all the aggregates of molecules that make it
up. As these examples suggest, the relation between a human person and a
particular human animal-the relation of constitution-is itself an instance
of a very general relation. The underlying idea of the general relation. of
constitution is this: when a thing of a certain kind is in certain circumstances, then a new thing of a different kind comes into being. For example, when a piece of plastic of a certain kind is imprinted in a certain way
during a govemment-sanctioned process, then a new thing, an Australian
twenty-dollar billt comes into existence. A piece of money is a fundamentally different kind of thing from a piece of plastic. The political and economic institutions and conventions that make it the case that a piece of
money exists are not required for a piece of plastic to exist. A piece of
n10ney has different kinds of causal powers from a piece of plastic that
does not constitute a piece of money.
Here is an example that illustrates the fact that constitution is not identity. The reasoning here is controversial, but I have defended it elsewhere. 12
Consider Betsy Ross/s first D.S. flag; call it 'Flag 1./ It was made by Ms.
Ross out of a particular piece of cloth; call that piece of cloth, 'Cloth 1./ No
national flag could exist in a world without certain intentions and political
conventions. Anational flag is a different kind of thing from a piece of
cloth. (Some people consider national flags and other symbols sacred;
nobody considers a piece of cloth sacred unless it constitutes a symbol.
Laws are made to protect flags and other symbols, not to protect pieces of
cloth per se.) 50/ Flag 1 could not exist in a world without certain intentions and political conventions. But something that is a piece of cloth could
exist in a world without the intentions and political conventions necessary
for something to be a flag. Since there is a world in which Cloth 1 exists
but Flag 1 does not, Cloth 1 is not identical to Flag 1.
Let me make this point in a slightly different way: Being a flag and
being a piece of cloth are of distinct primary-kind properties. 13 Each thing
has its primary-kind essentially. Therefore, Flag 1 (which is of the primary
kind, flag) has a property that Cloth 1 (which is not of the primary kind,
flag) lacks. Flag 1 has the property of being a flag whenever al1d wherever

MATERIAL PERSONS AND RESURRECTION

155

it exists. Cloth I, which might have remained in Betsy Ross's sewing basket and never have constituted a flag at all, does not have the property of
being a flag whenever and wherever it exists. Therefore, on the classical
conception of identity, Cloth 1 is not identical to Flag 1.
Constitution explains the diversity of kinds of things. If x constitutes y
at t, then x and y are of different fundamental or primary kinds-as a
piece of marble is a fundamentally different kind of thing from astatue.
As I have said, things are members of their primary kinds essentia11y. If y's
primary kind is statue, then y could not exist without being a statue. 14 An
inventory of the world that mentioned pieces of marble, pieces of brass,
etc., but omitted mentiol1 of statues would be incomplete-as would an
inventory of the world that mentioned pieces of plastic, pieces of paper,
etc., but omitted mention of pieces of money or an inventory of the world
that mentioned aggregates of molecules but not rivers. Constitution is the
vehicle by which new kinds of things come into existence.
Even though constitution is not identity, it is a relation of genuine unity.
It is not just a fluke that x and y are at the same places at the same times
when they are constitutionally related. The unity is so tight-as tight as
possible short of identity-that if x constitutes y at t, then each derives or
borrows properties from the other at t. Omitting reference to time, on the
one hand, if x constitutes y, there are some properties that x could have
had whether it had constituted y or not, and some properties that y could
have had whether it had been constituted by x or not. These are properties
that x and y have nonderivatively. On the other hand, there are other
properties that x (or y) has only in virtue of its constitution relations to
something that has those properties nonderivatively. These are properties
that x and y 11ave derivatively. So, there are two ways to have a property:
derivatively or nonderivatively.
Here is an example. Consider my D.S. driver's license, constituted by a
rectangular piece of plastic. The piece of plastic has the property of being
rectangular nonderivatively (it could have had that property without constituting anything); the driver's license has the property of being rectangular derivatively (it has the property who11y in virtue of being constituted by
something that has the property of being rectangular nonderivatively). On
the other hand, the driver's license has the property of a110wing you to
drive legally nonderivatively (its having that property does not depend on
what constitutes it); but the piece of plastic has the property of allowing
you to drive legally derivatively (it has that property wholly in virtue of
constituting a driver's license).
Again, 1'11 skip the technical account of the idea of havü1g a property
derivatively, but I want to mention two features of the account. First, not
every property (e.g., the property of being astatue essentially) is a property
that can be had derivatively.15 Second, primary-kind properties, like the
property of being astatue, may be had either nonderivatively (by anything
whose primary kind is designated by the property) or derivatively (by something constitutionally-related to something whose primary kind is designated by the property). For example, Cloth 1 is a piece of cloth nonderivatively;
Flag 1 is a piece of cloth derivatively. Flag 1 is anational flag nonderivatively; Cloth 1 is anational flag derivatively (as long as it constitutes a flag).
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Since constitution is a relation of unity, when x constitutes y, there is a
unitary thing-y, as constituted by x-which is a single thing. As long as x
constitutes y, x has no independent existence. If x continues to exist after
the demise of y, then x comes into its own, existing independently. But
during the period that x constitutes y, "what the thing really is"-y, constituted by x-is determined by the identity of y. So, what is in front of you
when you go to a museum is astatue (constituted, perhaps, by a piece of
marble).16 You krlow what the thing is if you see that it is astatue; you do
not know what it is if you see only that it is a piece of marble. 17 This sort of
homegrown anti-reductionism seems to me to be part of our commonsense
conception of the world: What the thing most fundamentally is is astatue;
but it is constituted by a piece of marble.
Let us now turn to persons. Under what circumstances does an organism constitute aperson? As I mentioned, what makes it the case that something is a person is a first-person. perspective or a narrowly-construed physical capacity to support one. So, the circumstances Lmder which an organism constitutes a person are the organismic and environmental conditions
conducive to development and maintenance of a first-person perspective.
So, we need to see wh.at it means to have a first-person perspective.
A first-person perspective is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself.
This is not just the ability to use the first-person pronoun; rather, it requires
that one can conceive of oneself as the referent of the first-person. pronoun
independently of any name or description of oneself. In English, this ability is manifested in the use of a first-person pronoun embedded in a clause
introduced by a psychological or lingLlistic verb in a first-person sentence.
For example, "I wish that I were a movie star," or "I said that I would do
it" or "I wonder how 1'11 die" all illustrate a first-person perspective. The
second occurrence of '1' in each of those sentences shows that the speaker is
conceiving of herself in the first-person, without the need for any name or
description. Even if you had total amnesia-and didn't know your name
or anything at all about your past-you could still think of yourself as
yourself. An.y being whatever with the ability to think of itself as itselfwhether a divine being, an artificially manufactured being (like a computer), a human clone, a Martian, anything that has a first-person perspective-is aperson. A human person is a person (i.e., a being with a first-person perspective) that is constituted (at least at the beginning of his or her
existence) by a human body.
For a human person, the first-person perspective includes a first-person
relation to her body. Smith has a first-person relation to her body if she
can conceive of its properties as her own. For example, even if she is totally paralyzed, Smith has a first-person relation to her body if she can entertain the thought, "I wonder if 1'11 ever walk again." Gr again: Smith
makes first-person reference to her body as herself when she thinks about
how beautiful she looks in the yearbook, or worries about how sh.e might
be injured skydiving-thoughts that she would express with first-person
pron.ouns. As we have seen, constitution is a very intimate relation. Since
a human person is constituted by a body, a first-person reference to one's
body is ipsojacto a first-person reference to oneself.
A human body that permanently loses the ability to support a first-per-
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son perspective ceases to constitute aperson. Suppose that Smith is in an
automobile accident and goes into what is called 'a persistent vegetative
state,' in which the parts of her brain that support the higher fLillctions are
destroyed. Suppose that it is physically impossible that the brain ever
again support the thought that Smith would express by saying, "I exist."
Then, on the Constitution View, Smith is no longer there. The organism is
still alive, but it no longer constitutes a person. On the other end, a human
organism (e.g., an embryo) that cannot support a first-person perspective
does not constitute aperson.
The relation between astatue and the piece of marble that makes it up
also satisfies the same general conditions as does the relation between a
human person and her body. That piece of marble constitutes the statue in
exactly the same sense that a human body constitutes aperson. The difference between the two cases is what is required for the existence of the ontologically higher thing. What is required for the existence of astatue is a
relation to an artworld; and what is required for the existence of a person is
a first-person perspective (or a narrowly-defined capacity for one). So,
hun1an persons are part of the natural world in the same way that statues
are. There's no special pleadill.g for human persons.
Although human persons are part of the natural world, they are a distinctive part. The first-person perspective that human persons havewhether it evolved by natural selection, or was specially introduced by
God, or came into existence in some other way-is a genuine novelty. A
world without beings that have first-person perspectives (i.e., a world
without persons) would not have in it the same beings as our world, even
if that personless world had humal1 organisms in it. This is to say that persons make an ontological difference. Persons are fundamentally a different
kind of being from other things. The difference that a first-person perspective makes cannot be overestimated. The first-person perspective ties
what is distinctive about us and what matters most deeply to us to what
we most fundamentally are.
What is distinctive about us is that we, alone among the creatures, have
a conception of ourselves as beings with futures. Only persons can conceive of having a future, for which they have hopes and fears; only persons
can make plans to try to control their futures. Only persons can entertain
the thought, "What kind of being am I?" Only those who can think of
themselves as themselves (i.e., only persons) can think of themselves as
having values that they can assess. Animals that do not constitute persons
can attempt to survive and reproduce, but-being unable to conceive of
themselves in the uniquely first-personal way-they cannot try to change
their natural behavior. Things that matter deeply to us-our values, our
futures, our ultimate destinies-eould matter only to beings with first-person perspectives. No animal that lacked a first-person perspective could
find these things important. That is the reason, I believe, that we, alone
among creatures, have religion, science, art, and government.
So persons matter to themselves in a way that nonpersons CalLnot matter
to themselves. But the importance and distinctiveness of persons is not just
a parochial business of mattering to ourselves. Persons are important in
the scheme of things as bearers of normativity-in at least two ways. Only
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persons, who can appreciate that they have dOlle things in the past, can be
called morally into account. And orLly persons, who can know that they
have goals and subject them to scrutiny, can be called rationally into
account. Only persons can be rational agents and moral agents. The
appearance of persons in the natural world is the appearance of a genuinely new kind of being.
Another way to put this point is that persons qua persons have ontological significallce. Being a person is not just a contingent and temporary property that some fundamentally nonpersonal beings (like organisms) have.
When an organism comes to have a first-person perspective, it does not just
acquire new property; it comes to constitute a new thing-a person.
I have now set out in cursory fashion my view of human persons. A
human person most fundamentally is aperson, a being with a first-person
perspective. The Constitution View offers an alternative to both
Immaterialism and Animalism. Obviously, on the Constitution View, a
human person most fundamentally is neither an immaterial soul nor an
anima!. It should be clear that the Constitution View is also an alternative
to Aquinas's hybrid view. Thus, the widely assumed conditional-If
human persons do not have immaterial souls, then they have the persistence conditions of animals-is false. According to the Constitution View,
human persons neither have imrnaterial souls, nor do they have the persistence conditions of animals.
Before moving on to the Christian doctrine of resurrection, I'd like to
address an objection to the Constitution View of human persons. (I have
replied to many objections in detail elsewhere.) 1'11 cast the objection in the
form of a dilemma. Suppose that Jones, a human person, is constituted by
an organism that we'll call'Body.' Either Body is a person or Body is not a
person. If Body is not a person, then the Constitution View is convicted of
arbitrariness. Since Body is psychologically and physically exactly like
Jones, it would be arbitrary to hold Jones to be a person and not Body. But
if Body is a person, then since the Constitution View holds that Body is not
identical to Jones, there are two persons where Jones is-Jones and Body.
Both alternatives are untenable.
Here is my reply: The Constitution View denies the second horn of the
dilemma. Body most certainly is a person, but there are not thereby two
persons where Jones iso This is so, because Body is derivatively aperson.
Jones is nonderivatively aperson, and Body's being a person depends
wholly on Body's relation to Jones. Body is not a separate person on her
own, so to speak, or a different person from Jones.
In general, you can't add a derivative to a nonderivative instance of
being an F to get two Fs. The fact that y is an F derivatively just is the fact
that y is constitutionally related to something that is an F nonderivatively.
Continuing to omit reference to time, if x constitutes y/ and x is an F nonderivatively and y is an F derivatively, then there are not thereby two Fs.
Typically, we count not by identity, but by identity-or-constitution: 18 For
many properties,
(5) xis the same F as y if and only if [(x = y or x constitutes y or y constitutes x) and x is an F].
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So, Body is the same person as Jones. 5imilar reasoning shows that Jones is
an animal, but there are not two animals where Jones iso Jones is an animal
derivatively, wholly in virtue of being constituted by something that is an
animaI nonderivatively. So, Jones is not aseparate or different animaI
from Body. Jones is the same animal as Body.
Now I want to show that this conception of a human person is compatible with the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body.

The Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead
For any conception of person, the question of whether it is compatible with
the doctrine of resurrection concems the conditions for identity over time
for persons, as held by that conception. For Immaterialists, x is the same
person as y only if x is the same immaterial soul as y. For Animalists, x is
the same person as y only if x is the same organism as y. For
Con.stitutionalists, x is the same person as y only if x has the same first-person perspective as y. So, the question of compatibility with the doctrine of
resurrection can be asked for each view like this: Let x be a human person
alive and well in 1900, and let y be a resurrected person in heaven at some
later time; is it possible on the view in question that x is identical to y?
Immaterialism is compatible with. the doctrine of resurrection only if it
allows that x and y can be the same soul; Animalism is compaiible with the
doctrine of resurrection only if it allows that x and y can be the same organism. The Constitution View is compatible with the doctrine of resurrection
only if it allows that x and y can have the same first-person perspective.
To show that the Constitution View is compatible with the doctrine of
resurrection, let me begin with some comments about the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the dead. The doctrine is sketchy, pieced
together out of hints and metaphors in Scripture. Perhaps the most specific
account of an afterlife in the New Testament is in I Corinthians 15, but this
passage is notoriously open to several interpretations. There is not even
unanimity about whether there is immediate resurrection at the instant of
death, or whether there is a temporary mode of existence before the general resurrection at the end of time. 19 However, let me say three things about
the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead.
First, the doctrine concerns some kind of bodily life after death.
Resurrection bodies are different from earthly bodies in that they are said
to be spiritual bodies, glorified bodies, incorruptible bodies. Even if there
is an "intermediate state" between death and a general resurrection, those
who ultimately live after deatl'1 will be embodied, according to Christian
doctrine. So, Christian resurrection requires some kind of a body.
5econd, according to the doctrine of Resurrection of the Body, individuals exist after death, not in some undifferentiated state merged with the
universe, but as individuals. Not only is there to be individual existence in
the Resurrection, but the same individuals are to exist both now and in an
afterlife. So, the relation between a person here and now and a person in
the Resurrection must be identity. "Survival" in some weaker sense is not
enough. It must be possible that the very same individuals that exist now
will exist 101'1g after their deaths. It must be possible that some person with
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a resurrection body be identical to you. Resllrrection requires iden.tity of
earthly persons and resurrected persons.
Third, life after death, according to Christian doctrine, is a gift from God.
The Christian doctrine thus contrasts with the Greek idea of the immortality
of the soul. According to the Greeks (e.g., Plato in the Phaedo), the soul is
naturally immortal and without any outside intervention persists after the
death of the body. (In addition, the soul subsequently returns to earth in a
different body.) The Christian, whether or not she believes in an immaterial soul, does not take an afterlife to be part of the natural course of events.
Rather, it is part of God's gracious bounty. The idea of miracle is built into
the Christian doctrine of life after death at the beginning.
So, there are three points to keep in mind: First, the doctrine of
Christian resurrection requires bodily life after death. Second, it requires
identity between an ordinary flesh-and-blood person and a resurrected
person. And third, according to Christian doctrine, reSLlrrection is miraculous. Now consider how the Constitution View accommodates these three
features of resurrection.
First, according to the Constitution View, I am essentially embodied;
although I do not necessarily have the body that I in fact have now, I never
can exist without any body at alle So, the fact that Christian resurrection is
bodily resurrection is no problem for the Constitution View. The
Immaterialist, who thinks that a human person is identical to an immaterial SOl:L1, is left with a question of why resurrection should be bodily at alle
The Constitutionalist has an easyanswer: we could not exist without bodies of some kind or other. So, if we are to exist in an afterlife, we will be
embodied. But the fact that, according to the Constitution View, I cannot
exist without some body or other does not take us very far. What is needed
is to ll1ake sense of the idea that SOll1e future person is identical with me.
So, second, we need a criterion for sall1eness of person over time. On
the Constitution View, sameness of person is sameness of first-person perspective. Person PI at tl is identical to person P2 at t2 if and only if PI and
P2 have the same first-person perspective. Again, fine, but what is the criterion for sameness of first-person perspective? I doubt that there is any
such noncircular and informative criterion to be stated. 20 It is a primitive
fact that some future person with a body different from mine is I; but there
is a fact of the matter nonetheless.
Although no conditions for sameness of first-person perspective over
time will be forthcoll1ing, if lexist at some future time, I shall know it. This
is an odd, even unique, feature of the first-person perspective, and the one
place where Descartes was on the right track: I can know, with certainty,
that I exist. I know that lexist without having to identify myself in any
way. I wake up in the morning, and without checking the mirror or consulting my memories, I know that lexist. The person I know to be waking
up is I, is identical to me. Since I do not have to identify myself (say, by
my appearance or my mental states), there is no possibility of rnisidentifying myself. I may have complete amnesia; I may have been in a totally
disfiguring automobile accident; I may be covered with bandages and
unable to move. Still, I can be certaill. that lexist.
Consider an extreme case. The envisaged case may be impossible, but if
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the Constitution View can show in this case that there is a fact of the matter
as to whether a particular person is idel1tical to me, then I don't think that
it has any conceptual problems with supposing that some resurrected person is identical to me.
Suppose that a mad scientist n1anaged to duplicate me overnight using
a brain-state transfer device, and that he cleverly fashioned bodies, so that
now there are 100 physical and psychological replicas of me-each sincerely claiming to be Lynne Baker, each reporting past events that only I knew
about before I was duplicated, each looking just like me. Notice that the
Constitution View, unlike other materialistic views, does not have the
untenable consequence that they are all Lynne Baker. All 100 of the duplicates are psychologically continuous with n1e when I went to bed, bllt the
Constitution View does not hold that psychological continuity is sufficient
for personal identity over time. What is required is sameness of first-person perspective. The 100 duplicates all have different first-person perspectives-even if each of the first-person perspectives is "qualitatively indistinguishable" from mine. They have different first-person perspectives
(and hence are different persons), in virtue of the fact that they have firstperson relations to completely different bodies. A sufficient condition for
there to be 101 persons, according to tl1e Constitution View, is that there be
101 first-person relations to 101 bodies. The fact that each claims to be
Lynne Baker, and the fact that each has apparent memories qualitatively
similar to Lynne Baker's, and the fact that each looks like Lynne Baker are
all irrelevant to whether any of them is actually Lynne Baker. At most, one
of them can have my first-person perspective. 50/ the first point is that
Constitution View does not have the untenable consequence that more
than one future person is 1.
The second point is that there is a fact of tl1e matter whether one of the
future persons is I, and if so, which one. There is not only a fact of the matter w11ich one is l, but also I will know which one is I. There is also a fact of
the matter which one is Lynne Baker, but it is possible that no one (not
even l, Lynne Baker) will know which one is Lynne Baker. To see this,
consider a continuation of the fantasy: After mixing me (Lynne Baker) into
the crowd of duplicates, not even the mad scientist can tell which one is
really Lynne Baker. I may not know which one is Lynne Baker; the claims
of all the others to be Lynne Baker may shake my confidence, or I may mistakenly think that I have amnesia. Although I may not know which one is
Lynne Baker, I still know which one is me. (This is the peculiarity of the
first-person perspective: I know that I exist, and that I am this one; knowing which one is Lynne Baker is another matter.) And each of the others
who thinks that she is Lynne Baker knows which one is she. For any one
of us/ she may be mistaken that she is Lynne Baker, but she is not mistaken
that she exists (and that she is distinct from all the others).
Therefore, there is a fact of the matter about which future person is l,
and I shall know it. (lf no future person is l, then of course I will not know
that; in that case, I won't be around to know anything.) There is also a fact
of the matter about which future person is Lynne Baker, but it is possible
that nobody will know it-not even me. There is a fact about which person last nigl1t was Lynne Baker, and she was 1. Any future person who is I
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is Lynne Baker. There is a fact of the matter about which future person is I.
Therefore, there is a fact of the matter about which future person is Lynne
Baker, even if no mortal (including Lynne Baker) knows it.
We can apply these points to the case of resurrection. The Constitution
View of human persons is compatible with several interpretations of the
doctrine of resurrection. On the interpretation according to which a human
person exists in some intermediate state between her death and a general
resurrection in the future, the Constitution View would postulate an intermediate body. (Alternatively, the Constitution View is compatible with
there being a temporal gap in the person's existence). And on the interpretation according to which resurrection is an eschatalogical event outside of
time altogether, Smith acquires a resurrection body at death and passes
directly into eternity. The Constitution View is compatible with either of
these interpretations of the doctrine of resurrection. Although there are no
doubt difficulties with any interpretation of the doctrine, the Constitution
View does not make the difficulties any more intractable than they already
were. On the Constitution View, it is possible that a future person with a
resurrected body is identical to me, and there is a fact of the matter about
which, if any, such future person is J.
Now turn to the third feature of the Christian doctrine of resurrection.
Resurrection is a gift from God. Any resurrection is a miracle. The
Constitution View can use this feature to show its compatibility with the
doctrine of resurrection. Recall that although a hun1an person is essentially
embodied, it is not necessary that she have the body that she in fact hase
Therefore, Smith, say, might have had a different body. So, 'Smith is the
person with body l' is contingently true if true at all. Now, according to a
traditional doctrine of Providence, God has two kinds of knowledge-free
knowledge and natural knowledge. God's free knowledge is knowledge
of contingent truths, and his natural knowledge is knowledge of logical
and n1etaphysical necessities. (I'm disregarding the possibility of middle
knowledge here.) Again, according to this traditional doctrine of
Providence, the obtaining of any contingent state of affairs depends on
God's free decree. Whether the person with resLlrrected body 1, or body 2,
or some other body is Smith is a contingent state of affairs. Therefore,
which if any of these states of affairs obtains depends on God's free decree.
No immaterial soul is needed for there to be a fact of the matter as to
whether Smith is the person with resurrected body 1. All that is needed is
God's free decree that brings about one contingent state of affairs rather
than another. If God decrees that the person with body 1 have Smith's
first-person perspective, then Smith is the person with body 1.21 So, there is
a fact of the matter as to which, if any, of the persons in the Resurrection is
Smith, even if we creatures cannot know it.
A by-product of this use of the doctrine of God's Providence is that it
also provides for the metaphysical impossibility of Smith's being identical
to both the person with body 1 and the person with body 2. For it is part of
God's natural knowledge that it is metaphysically impossible for one person to be identical to two persons. And according to the notion of God's
natural knowledge, what is metaphysically impossible is not within God's
power to bring about.
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Without appeal to an immaterial soul, then, a Christian can tell a theologically acceptable story that renders it determinate whether Smith is
identical to any given resurrected person. God's natural knowledge rules
out the possibility that the person with body 1 and the person with body 2
are both Smith, and his free knowledge guarantees that there is a fact of the
matter about which (if either) is Smith. So, I don't think that the difficulties
raised by the doctrine of resurrection are any more serious for a Christian
proponent of the Constitution View than they are for any other Christian.
To sum up: I started with three features of the Christian doctrine of resurrection, and then I showed how the Constitution View fit in with each
one: The Constitution View is clearly compatible with bodily resurrection.
The Constitution View allows for there being a fact of the matter as to
which, if any, future person is I. The Constitution View can exploit the fact
that, according to ChTistian doctrine (sketchy as it is), resurrection is miraculous. Given a Christian idea of Providence, it is weIl within God's power
to bring it about that a certain resurrected person is identical to Smith.
Therefore, on the Constitution View of human persons, resurrection is
metaphysically possible.

Why Christians Should Prefer the Constitution View
The Constitution View, then, is a materialistic conception of human persons that is compatible with the Christian doctrine of resurrection. Let me
conclude by saying why I think that Christians should endorse the
Constitution View over both Immaterialism and Animalism.
First, Immaterialism. As I argued elsewhere, if a Christian does not
need to be a Substance Dualist, then she should not be. 22 There are wellknown intractable difficl:L1ties with the notion of an immaterial soul and its
relation to a human body. Moreover, the Constitution View can give the
Immaterialist almost all that he wants without invoking immaterial souls.
For example, the Constitutionalist can agree with the Immaterialist on
many important points: Constitutionalists and Immaterialist agree that
the identity conditions of persons are different from the identity conditions
of animals, that identity (and not just psychological similarity) matters for
survival, that it is possible for a human person to have a different body
from the one that she actually has, and that there is a fact of the matter
(perhaps not ascertainable by us) as to whether or not a particular person
in the future is I. Since the Constitutionalist can give the Immaterialist
almost all of what she wants without recourse to immaterial souls, I see
nothing to recommend Immaterialism over the Constitution View.
Now consider Animalism. (1'11 confine my comments on Animalism to
the variety that takes human animals to be identical to human bodies and
human. persons to be identical to human animals.)23 There are several reasons for a Christian not to be an Animalist, even if Animalism is not logically incompatible with the doctrine of resurrection. First, Animalism
splits off what we most fundamentally are from what is most distinctive
and important about uso If Animalism is correct, then our havin.g first-person perspectives is entirely irrelevant to what we most fundamentally are.
Animalists are explicit on this point: As one Animalist put it recently,
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"psychology is con1pletely irrelevant to personal identity."24 Or as he put it
in another place, "[Y]ou can continue to exist without being aperson, just

as you could continue to exist without being a philosopher, or a student or
a fancier of fast cars."25 On the Animalist View, my being a person is metaphysically on a par with my "being a philosopher, or a student or a fancier
of fast cars." That is, from an Animalist point of view, our having first-person perspectives (or any mental states at all) simply doesn't matter to the
kind of beings that we are.
However, the Christian story could not get off the ground without presupposing first-person perspectives. On the human side, without first-person perspectives, there would be no sinners and no penitents. Since a person's repentance requires that she realize that she herself has offended,
nothing lacking a first-person perspective could possibly repent. On the
divine side: Christ's atonement required that he suffer, and an important
aspect of his suffering was llis anticipation of his death (e.g., the agony in
the Garden of Gethsemane); and his anticipation of his death would have
been impossible without a first-person perspective. This part of Christ's
mission specifically required a first-person perspective. What is important
about us (and Christ) according to the Christian story is that we have firstperson perspectives. Given how important the first-person perspective is
to the Christian story, Christians have good reason to take our having firstperson perspectives to be central to the kind of being that we are.
The second reason for a Christian to endorse the Constitution View over
Animalism is that the Constitution View allows that a person's resurrection body may be nonidentical with her earthly biological body.
According to the Constitution View, it is logically possible that a person
have different bodies at different times; whether anyone ever changes bodies or not, the logical possibility is built into the Constitution View. By contrast, on the Animalist View, a person just is-is identical to-an organism.
Whatever happens to the organism happens to the person. On an
Animalist View, it is logically impossible for you to survive the destruction
of your body. So, on an Animalist View, if Smith, say, is resurrected, then
the organism that was Smith on earth mustpersist in heaven. The resurrection body must be that very organism. 26 In that case, any Animalist
View compatible with Christian resurrection will have implausible features about the identity conditions for organisms.
Let me elaborate. If, as on the Animalist View, a person's resurrection
body were identical to her mortal body, then we would have new questions about the identity conditions for bodies: NonChristian Animalists
understand our identity conditions in terms of continued biological functioning. But Christian Animalists who believe in resurrection. cannot construe our identity conditions biologically unless they think that resurrected
persons are maintained by digestion, respiration and so on as earthly persons are. Since the bodies of resurrected persons are incorruptible, it seems
unlikely that they are maintained by biological processes (like digestion,
etc.) as ours are. But if biological processes are irrelevant to the identity
conditions of resurrected persons, and if, as Animalism has it, biological
processes are essential to our identity conditions, then how is it even logically possible for a resurrected person to be identical to any of us?
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Something whose identity conditions are biological cannot be identical to
something whose identity conditions are not.
To put it another way, a Christian Animalist who believes in resurrection must hold that earthly bodies, which are corruptible, are identical to
resurrection bodies, which are incorruptible. Since I think that biological
organisms are essentially corruptible, I do not believe that a resl.-lrrection
body, which is incorruptible, could be identical to a biological organism.
Even if I'm wrong about the essential corruptibility of organisms, however,
the fact remains that on Christian Animalism, the identity conditions for
organisms would be beyond the purview ofbiology.27
Moreover, death would have to be conceived of in a very unusual way
by an Animalist who is a Christian: On a Christian Animalist view, a person/organism does not really die (e.g., God snatches it away immediately
before death and replaces it with a simulacrum that dies). Platonists
would say tl'lat the body dies, but the soul never dies; it lives straight on
through the body's death. Christian Animalists would have to say something even stranger: the body of a resurrected person does not die either, if
by 'die' we nleal1 cease functioning permanently. Death for human persons who will be resurrected, on this view, would just be an illusion. I do
not think that that conception of death comports well with the story of the
Crucifixion, which suggests that death is horrendous and not at all illusory.
So, there are several reasons why a Christian should prefer the
Constitution View to Animalism. In order to make Animalism compatible
with the doctrine of resurrection, the Christian Animalist would have to
make two unpalatable moves: Slle would have to conceive of identity COl1ditions for organisms to be at least partly nonbiological, and she would
have to reconceive the death of a human person in a way that did not
involve demise of the organism to which the person is allegedly identical.
Perhaps even more important is the fact that, according to Animalism, the
property of being a person or of having a first-person perspective is just a
contingent and temporary property of fundamentally nonpersonal beings:
Animalism severs what is most distinctive about us from what we most
fundamentally are. On the Animalist View, persons qua persons have no
ontological significance. I think that these are all good reasons for a
Christian to prefer the Constitution View to Animalism.

Conclusion
I hope to have shown three things: First, Animalism is not the only materialistic alternative to Immaterialism. The Constitution View of human persons is fully materialistic and can be worked out in detail. Second, the
Constitution View of human persons is compatible witll the doctrine of resurrection. Third, the Constitution View of human persons is preferable to
its main rivals, Immaterialism and Animalism. So, with respect to the doctrine of resurrection, a Christian need not choose between Immaterialism
and Animalisnl. The Constitution View is waiting in the wingS. 28
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NOTES

1. The label comes from Paul Snowdon, one of the proponents of
Animalism. P.F. Snowdon, "Persons, Animals, and Ourselves" in The Person and
the Human Mind, Christopher Gill, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): 83-107.
2. See Peter van Inwagen's "The Possibility of Resurrection" in Immortality,
Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: Macn1illan Publishing Co., 1992): 242-46.
Reprinted from The International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 9 (1978).
3. The doctrine of resurrection casts doubt on Animalism, but does not
logically preclude it. Van Inwagen (op. eit.) points out that even if human persons are identical to animals, a human person could have life after death if God
miraculously preserved the original anin1al. But after dissolution, that very
organism (and hence the person) could not live again. Also see Dean
Zimmerman, "The Con1patibility of Materialism and Survival: The 'Falling
Elevator' Model," Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999): 194-212.
4. Whatever problems arise for Animalists with respect to life after death
would also arise for those Immaterialists who (like the majority of Christians
through the ages) believe that in the Resurrection one's soul is reunited with
the same body that died and decayed (or was burned, or whatever).
5. See Dean Zimmerman, op. eit., for a view of how Animalists can believe
in life after death.
6. Contemporary Christians who are materialists (e.g., Peter van Inwagen)
seem to accept this conditional as well as contemporary immaterialists (e.g.,
Dean Zimmerman).
7. See Marilyn McCord Adams, "The Resurrection of the Body According
to Three Medieval Aristotelians: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns, Scotus, William
Ockham," Philosophieal Topies 20 (1992): 1-33.
8. There is another variety of dualism, recently developed by William
Hasker in The Emergent Self (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) and promoted by Dean Zimmerman and Ted Warfield in "We Are Not Animals"
delivered in a Plenary Session of the Pacific Meeting of the Society of Christian
Philosophers, March 24, 2000.
9. "Need a Christian be a Mind/Body Dualist?" Faith and Philosophy 12
(1995): 489-504.
10. Any believer in the Christian Trinity is committed to there being some

such relation. I'm not suggesting that a believer in the Christian Trinity will
endorse constitution as I construe it; rather, a Christian is in no position to
reject my view on the grounds that the idea of a relation between identity and
separate existence is incoherent.
11. In Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge
Dniversity Press, 2000), and in "Dnity Without Identity: A New Look at
Material Constitution," New Direetions in Philosophy, Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 23, Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, eds. (MaIden, MA:
Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1999): 144-165, I have given a con1pletely general
definition of 'x constitutes y at t.' Here 1'11 drop the reference to time when no
confusion will ensue.
12. See "Why Constitution is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997):
599-621.
13. It is only in virtue of its primary-kind property that something can

enter into a constitution-relation. So, we would not want to say that achair
constituted an antique. Being an antique is a property that the chair may have
if it is old; it is not a primary-kind property.
14. For a more detailed exposition of constitution, see Ch. 2 of Persons and
Bodies, or "Unity Without Identity."
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15. 'Having a property derivatively' is not defined for any properties of the
following types: (a) properties expressed in English by the locutions 'essentially' or 'necessarily' or 'primary kind' (as in 'has F has its primary-kind property'), or variants of such terms ("alethic properties"); (b) properties expressed in
English by the locutions fis identical to' or 'constitutes' or 'exists' or variants of
such terms ("identity/ constitution/existence properties"); (c) properties of any
sort such that necessarily, x has one at t only if x exists at some time other than
t ("properties rooted outside the times at which they are had"-Roderick
Chisholm's term); (d) properties that are conjunctions of two or more properties that either entail or are entailed by two or more primary-kind properties
("hybrid properties"). For more detail, see Persons and Bodies, Ch. 2.
16. Although "what the thing really is" is astatue, the constituting piece of
marble itself does not have the persistence conditions of astatue. The persistence conditions of x do not change; the piece of marble is essentially a piece of
marble, whether it constitutes astatue or not.
17. In "Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of
the relations An10ng Objects, Sorts, Sortals and Persistence Conditions" (Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 54 (1994): 591-624), Michael Burke offers a view that
seems to fit parts of this description. As I understand it, Burke's account, applied
to the relation between persons and bodies, has the following as a consequence:
Human-body 1 (a fetus, when it is not aperson) is not the same human body as
Human-body 2 (an adult, who is a person spatiotemporally continuous with
Human-body 1). This consequence seems implausible. Whatever we say about
persons and bodies, surely there is only one human body throughout-from fetus
to corpse. My view of persons and bodies allows that there is a single human
body, and at times it constitutes a person and at other times, it does not.
18. This discussion is very sketchy. For fuller discussion and defense of the
Constitution View, see Persons and Bodies.
19. See John W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology
and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1989).
20. cf. Trenton Merricks, "There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time,"
Nous 32 (1998): 106-124.
21. cf. Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993: 119-121.
22. "Need a Christian be a Mind/Body Dualist?" Faith and Philosophy.
23. Another kind of animalism, endorsed by David Wiggins, holds that
human persons are identical to human animals, but that human animals are
not identical to human bodies.
24. Eric T. Olson, "Was I Ever a Fetus?" Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 57 (1997): 97.
25. Eric T. Olson, The Human Animal (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997): 17.
26. Since I am persuaded by Peter van Inwagen's argument against the

identity of an organism that is destroyed now and any future organism, I do
not believe that an Animalist can countenance the total destruction or disintegration of a person/organism who is to have an afterlife.
27. Moreover, a Christian Animalist who believed in resurrection would
have to allow that organisms can undergo physically impossible changes without ceasing to exist. For example, organisms would disappear at one place (on
earth at the place where the death certificate says that they died) and reappear
at some other place.
28. Thanks are due to Katherine A. Sonderegger, Gareth B. Matthews, and
Dean Zimmerman for comments on versions of this paper.

